Numbers
In this paper I present a hypertext version of Wittgenstein's Tractatus which I have developed since 2004 (see http://www.bazzocchi.com/wittgenstein/ default.asp). The hypertext shows Wittgenstein's Tractatus according to its logical architecture and enables the reader to follow its structural nexuses rather than the flat sequence of the printed pages. In my hypertext oriented interpretation of the Tractatus, the fundamental key is the numbers of the remarks. I believe that they are to be taken very seriously, as are Wittgenstein's words when he writes to von Ficker: «The decimal numbers of my remarks must absolutely be printed alongside them, because they alone give to the book perspicuity [Übersichtlichkeit] and clarity: without the numbering it would be an incomprehensible jumble» 1 . From my perspective, the best way of making us see the Tractatus in its proper shape, is to interpret the decimals as technical specifications in order to generate a hypertext (decimals are able to exactly define the organization of the pages, and the connections and the positions of all the remarks). Investigating the hypertext generated from the decimal numbers of the propositions seems in fact to correspond to the proposal contained in the Tractatus' explicative note, if we interpret it not as a justification for an unusual numeration, but as a reference to the deep structure of the book, and also as a reading prescription. «Therefore propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7» -Wittgenstein specified in the original version of the note -«are the cardinal propositions, propositions n.1, n. 2, n.3, etc . are comments to the proposition N° n; propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. comments to the proposition N°n.m; and so on». 2 That is, we must be in a position to pick up at first sight the whole design of the work, in order then to be able to investigate every proposition, thereafter the comments to every investigation, and the comments to the comments, in cascade («and so on») throughout the innumerable paths that the recursive structure permits. 3 The main page of the hypertext is therefore the synthetic view with the seven cardinal propositions. It is the starting point for an initial idea of the work, its extreme synthesis -and also, each time, the conclusive page, the point of departure from the system. By clicking on a proposition, a detailed window opens: the proposition itself is on the top, followed by the comments of the immediate successive level. The approach to the text proceeds in an analogous way for every page: after one general look, we can decide to return to the origin page (eventually in order to choose a different path), or to continue towards a further level of comment; and so on recursively. The effect is to reconstruct the conceptual map thanks to logical relations, translated in spatial relations by the hypertext. Here really the logical space and the topological space concur to only one formal representation; aesthetic form and logical form are intuited along the same process of progressive exploration. The sharpening of the formal intuition can lead not only to a different understanding of the remarks, but also to a better sensibility regarding the architecture as a whole. On the home page, the structural asymmetry emerges at once between the first six propositions (on which we can click in order to open the windows of the analytical fractal) and proposition seven, a pure one-dimensional limit. If we observe that from the point of view of the anticipation supplied by the author in the Preface («The whole meaning of the book could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent»), we see that, by zooming in it, «what can be said clearly» progressively expands (propositions 1-6, etc.), while the second part always remains the same (proposition 7: «Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent»).
The same paradox returns in the letter to von Ficker: «My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. […] Where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it». Proposition 7 is no further analyzable because it's a pure limit, it's the envelope that delimits the world of the sayable within which we remain necessarily confined. In the key of Aristotelian ontology, it could be suggested that sections 1-6 constitute the matter of the work, while proposition 7 represents its form, i.e. its more inner character. In the hypertextual approach, all this returns at each immersion in the Tractatus, thanks to the architectonic asymmetry of proposition 7 that, starting from the home page, is reflected all through the travel. 4 By the way, note how much the home page of the hypertext is similar to the first page of the original drawing up of the Tractatus, at the beginning of the so-called "Prototractatus" notebook. Prototractatus' first page starts from the cardinal propositions and already contains 6 out of 7 of them, arranged together with some first level comments. In reality, it's probable that proposition 6 was added to the page only later on, when the drawing up process was much more ahead: but Wittgenstein seems to want to maintain precisely such a general and unitary outline. Oxford, MS. Germ. d. 7, p. 3) 
Linguistic games
Let us therefore begin travel in the hypertext -which here can only be shortly exemplified -along one of the more evident paths, through the synthetic page dedicated to the picture theory:
2.1 We make to ourselves pictures of facts. 2.2 The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.
Clicking on 2.1, we arrive at a more articulated panel (the only one in the Tractatus to contain nine propositions, the maximum number given by the decimal system of structuring), that marks an exhaustive and in itself completed progression. Dedicated to the remark «We make to ourselves pictures of facts», the screen embraces a rapid sequence, in which two distinguished formal ganglia ask for our attention. The more obvious, of acoustic rather than of grammatical nature, rises from the unusual assonance between propositions 2.17 and 2.18. Why therefore are they so similar, these two phrases that deal with similitude? What do they have in common between them, in the meanwhile explaining what picture and reality have in common?
Let's try and find an answer by means of pure formal tools, that is by mechanically copying all the propositional signs that are common to the two propositions. Therefore:
What picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it -rightly or falsely -is form .
As one can see, all that the two propositions (which illustrate what two similar objects have in common) have in their turn in common, forms an intelligible proposition that says that the two subjects of a pictorial relation (image and reality, proposition and reality, proposition and proposition) have form in common. We can continue with the syntactical manipulation, now playing the "spot the difference" game (between two pictures, or two propositions -it makes no difference, if propositions are like pictures). If we then align on the one hand the specific differences of 2.17, and on the other the specific differences of 2.18, we notice that they closely correspond. 2.17 represents the side of singularity: the single picture has in common with reality, in order to represent it after its manner, its form of representation. 2.18 picks up the aspect of the generalization: every picture, of whatever form, has in common with reality, in order to represent it at all, the logical form, that is the form of reality. With the charade, Wittgenstein emphasizes the jump to generalization, one that comprehends what all the possible images of a specific reality have in common, i.e. the logical structure of reality itself. The formal game between propositions 2.17 and 2.18, translated in similar icons, shines on the page and invites us to follow the reflections thus mirrored.
If someone has any doubt that the charade can only be a fortuitous event, he can examine how, on page 6 of the Prototractatus manuscript, Wittgenstein has repeatedly corrected the two propositions, with cuts and inserts, until balancing exactly, on the hidden phrase, the specific contribution of each of them ( fig. 5 ). It's a reasonable assumption that this "hidden phrase" had even been, from the chronological point of view, the original nucleus on which basis the 2.17 and 2.18 statements were defined. In fact, it appears already in the 1914 diary as: «The form of a picture can be said that in which the picture must concord with reality (in order to be able to represent it)» 6 . It's not surprising that the critical literature has never noticed the charade, even if this step has been greatly studied. In the traditional sequential way of reading the book, the point is not so evident, because our attention is totally engaged in managing formal and semantic relations between the various assertions. Moreover, in a sequential reading it is usual to assume a conceptual development from page to page, instead of a topological picture of conceptual relations. On the hypertext page, on the contrary, the logical form of the work is the backbone of the reading process itself, and our formal sensibility is enhanced at its upper level. It's impossible not to notice the particular relation between the two propositions. 193] . Of course the decisive step -the decisive juxtaposition -is between the remark 2.17 and its immediate neighbour (on the virtual page) 2.18: despite any interleaved comments. (I call "virtual" the hypertext pages because they depend only upon numerical relations and they don't correspond to any edited page. In effect, they are much more real than the paper pages stochastically separated by the printing process). Indeed, because of the way in which it shines in the hypertext stated by the decimal numeration, the formal game organized by Wittgenstein could be defined as anything but a furtive action.
Feelers
Let us again observe the shape of virtual page 2.1. A second obvious formal particularity can be noticed: there is one proposition formally different from the others. It is the 2.15 remark: the only one on the page which is composed, in effect, by two distinguished periods. To a great extent, the virtual page 2.1 had already been developed in 1915 in pages 4-6 of the Prototractatus, but at the time all propositions were rigorously composed by only one period. 7 The structure was supervised during the "Korrektur" in the summer of 1918; the two paragraphs of proposition 2.15, before untied, were reunited in the middle of the page, to illustrate how the possibility of the representation -indeed, of every possible structure -needs complexity.
A mouse that wishes to negotiate such a structure will suddenly find itself in a narrow passage, formed by only one tortuous concept: «The form of representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture» (2.151) . It leads to a pentad of further comments; it is on the tip of these sensitive fingers that «the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it» (2.1511) . Thanks to «the co-ordinations of the elements of the picture and the things» (2.1514), reality perhaps can even be touched: «These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality» (2.1515) 8 . It's difficult to return the clear impression that in this moment the hypertextual navigation gives, the impression i.e. of finding ourselves exactly on the thin veins of the feeler that is the 2.1 branch reaching towards the real world. «With "Fühler"» -specifies Wittgenstein to the editor Odgen -«I mean those things that butterflies have» [Wittgenstein 1973, p. 31] . The delicate extremity of the feeler still has a last extroversion: if the image wishes to become a meter and intends to measure scientifically 9 , in order to touch it must go further still: «Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch [berühren] the object to be measured» (2.15121).
The metaphor of the antennae already occurs in a curious reference of 15 October 1914, which points to a step outside the diaries; the reference would seem a punctual comment to these first pages of the Prototractatus (or, possibly, of some its predecessor; note that «here» the matter is not the picture, but «the proposition»): «Here I have considered the relations between the elements of the proposition and their meanings almost like feelers, by means of which the proposition is in contact with the external world; and generalizing a proposition then is like withdrawing the antennas. If, as McGuinness assumes, «the status of his own propositions is always in his mind» [McGuinness 1988, p . 302], we can here assume the metaphor of the antenna, therefore well nested in the architecture of the Tractatus, as implicitly referred by Wittgenstein to the structure itself of his work. The progressive refining of the decimal cascade runs from the general level of the cardinal propositions to the particular details of the more extreme branches, like feelers stretched towards the truth: in order then to repeat its travel backwards again and «to withdraw the antennas». The thin filigree of the hypertext becomes almost a sensitive perceptive apparatus with which we explore the world (as a metaphoric example, see fig. 6 ).
Symphonies and gramophones
The exploration of the hypertext, like a visit to a city 11 , has neither a proper point of departure, nor a definitive conclusion, but it's always in equilibrium between the formal net arranged by the author (that defines all exploration possibilities, i.e. the transcendental form of every possible travel) and the point of view, the idiosyncrasies and the choices of each reader. Rather, faced with the balanced dance of Tractatus articulations, we are tempted to try its barycentre. It is natural to test the fourth of the seven branches («The thought is the significant proposition»), which depicts the passage between the world of the facts and the world of the signs. On the rest, as McGuinness observes, «it is possible to defend the view that the work is a kind of systole and diastole around proposition 4, where the most basic propositions of its argument are to be found». 12 This central branch includes three sections. The first, with triple decimal, states that the specific argument is language, with its difficulties and consequent philosophical drifts. The last, with simple decimal, discusses form and content of a propositional sign. The middle section (with double decimal) aims to picture the pictorial ability of the language itself: we are at the centre of the issue of how the sign can stay in the place of something else. As McGuinness writes, «we are here at the heart of the Tractatus. The essence of its account of propositions is contained in the propositions number 4.01-4.0641». 13 The focus is directly in evidence: «The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is» (4.01). The analogy with the picture is explored in every possible suggestion: «A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture» (4.03); «Proposi-tions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality» (4.06). The most tangible modelling is at the bottom of the tentacles spread towards reality: «And so the whole, like a living picture, presents the atomic fact» (4.0311). But just in the investigation of 4.01 the analogy, the similitude, shows itself to be the essence of the linguistic act. The Tractatus barycentre is hypertext page 4.01. 14 This page is all a similitude, because the action itself of showing cannot be properly described, cannot further "be said". Proposition 4.015 points to the «possibility of all similes» and is placed between the metaphor of the music (to say nothing, between parenthesis, of the symbolism of the tales) and the similitude of hieroglyphic writing. «And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial nature», we discover that «that inner pictorial relation which holds between language and world» is the same one that puts in relation «the gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound» (4.014) .
Such phantasmagoria of metaphors encloses a last, further elucidation. It is not perhaps a fortuitous case that just on this page, from its more meaningful and evocative proposition (that joins the topic of the logical structure of the similitude to the symbolism of the tale), one can reach the last modification brought to the body of the Tractatus: the «addition 72» stuck in extremis to the typescript and lost on the troubled way to the German editor. The comment on which Wittgenstein has hesitated until the end, and that in the edition of the Annalen der Naturphilosophie leaves only one sibylline auto referential trace, specifies the logical statute of the «rule of translation». 15 The problem is whether the translation from one symbolism to an other is or is not governed by rules, if it's a solvable issue on the plan of the «log-ical structure» (that is, as it would be said in artificial intelligence, on the plan of the "manipulation of symbols"); this is naturally a crucial issue, on which successive Wittgensteinian reflection will become much more critical. By placing the Tractatus in equilibrium on the fulcrum of comment 4.0141, Wittgenstein resolves here to support the constituent nature of the rule: the inner likeness between conformations «which at first sight seem to be entirely different» would stand in the fact «that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again -by means of the first rule -construct the score». The ability to interpret the language is similar to the ability of the phonograph to reproduce the melody, for it brings this «law of projection» wired in its own structure. The metaphor of the gramophone, physical instantiation of «the rule of translation», almost seems to suggest the idea of artificial systems, based on formal rules, able to interpret «the logic of representation».
